First Things First

Iraqis: Sympathetic to the Insurgents?

The essence of counterinsurgency is encapsulated in the phrase "winning hearts and minds."  Anything that interferes with "winning hearts and minds" -- no matter how expedient and necessary an act may seem -- undercuts the lifeblood of a counterinsurgency effort. 

Iraqi Mother Watches As US Troops Search Home and Sons

T. E. Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia) put it in these terms:  an insurgency "must have a friendly population, not actively friendly, but sympathetic to the point of not betraying rebel movements to the enemy.  Rebellions can be made by 2% active in a striking force, and 98% passively sympathetic."

In this image (right) an Iraqi mother watches nervously as US troops search her home after receiving  information that armed insurgents were staying in her house.  Her house, located in the Hurriyah neighborhood of Baghdad, was searched in the early morning hours of September 13,2007.  Her two sons were humiliated and interrogated.  Then they were ordered to stand with their faces to the wall during the search.  US troops found no weapons or incriminating evidence to implicate the family. 

How many times do such events occur on a daily basis across the landscape of Iraq?   More than likely, too numerous to count!  Yet, as this image strongly suggests, it is through such acts of disrespect and intimidation that Iraqi "hearts and minds" eventually become "passively sympathetic" to the presence of the insurgents in their midsts.

The Logic of War and Personal Dignity

The success of counterinsurgency operations is contingent on winning the hearts and minds of populations.  Yet, U.S. operations in Iraq have been dominated primarily by the logic of war.  Between the two lies a contradiction.

U.S. Fighter Plane Dropping Laser Guided 2000 lb. Bomb

In the American context, the logic of war draws its form from the abstract and arcane world of high technology.  Among technology’s most lofty contributions to the logic of war are satellite and communications technologies, advanced aircraft, naval platforms, cruise missiles, laser guided weapons, and armored vehicles.  Each system, though discrete, is combined into a unified force by information technologies and seamless tactics.  Together, they create a potential to achieve maximal results against any similarly organized military force.  Thus, when set in motion, as it has been in Iraq under the rubric Shock and Awe, these coordinated energies unleash a frightful synergy that breeds an eerie military efficiency.

Against opposing forces, these energies inflict terror, paralysis, and sudden collapse.  In the hearts and minds of the world’s populations, they stir amazement and wonder -- at least for awhile!

Lawrence of Arabia and President Bush

T.E. Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia), was a British soldier and author whose life spanned the years 1888-1935.  He stands as a legendary hero in the theory and practice of guerilla warfare and in the history of Western relations with the populations of the Arab world.   Much of his experience took place in a country we now call Iraq.

Most people will remember Lawrence as he was lionized in David McLean's 1962 Academy Award winning documentary by the same name: Lawrence of Arabia.

T.E. Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia)

In his remarkable book, Seven Pillars of Wisdom, T.E. Lawrence describes his work to help unify Arab factions against the occupying Turkish army, circa World War I.  As he walks us through his remarkable experience, he offers this withering insight:

All men dream, but not equally. Those who dream by night in the dusty recesses of their minds wake in the day to find that it was vanity: but the dreamers of the day are dangerous men, for they may act their dream with open eyes, to make it possible.

In the terrifying new book by Robert Draper, Dead Certain: The Presidency of President George W. Bush,  Draper quotes Bush:

"'You're the observer,' he said as he worked the cheese in his mouth. 'I'm not.  I really do not feel comfortable in the role of analyzing myself.  I'll try"

"You've gotta think, think BIG."

"The Iranian issue," he said as bread crumbs tumbled out of his mouth and onto his chin, '"is the strategic threat right now facing a generation of Americans, because Iran is promoting an extreme form of religion that is competing with another extreme form of religion."

The Unlearned Lesson of Vietnam and Iraq

The conventional counter-wisdom to the Bush/Rumsfeld transformation strategy is that more military forces were needed from the outset to achieve success in postwar Iraq.  This view was set forth by General Shinseki and rebuffed by Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz.  The military held a similar view during the Vietnam conflict. 

To my knowledge, this belief has never been thoroughly examined in public debate, neither then nor now.  This neglect leaves a huge gap in America's strategic thinking because the logic of "more or less conventional military forces" masks the underlying truth of America's political failure in both conflicts.  Unless we debate this assumption more thoroughly, America will repeat the same mistakes again and again against future terrorist threats and insurgencies.

Violent Explosion in the Center of Baghdad.

There exists a third view: a military solution in Vietnam or Iraq was never possible.  To think otherwise is the product of reckless fancy.  A political strategy, i.e., civic action, is the only viable option.  The logic of this truth should have been obvious from the outset in both wars.

Recently, one Vietnam historian set forth the "template" rationale for failure in Vietnam and Iraq this way: 

Bush faces Johnson's earlier dilemma. The inadequate force commitments made respectively in 1965 and 2003 ordained our inevitable failures. In both cases, more able leaders were necessary, but maybe neither conflict was winnable within the parameters that this nation was willing to, or should, endure. The first law of strategy is to know the maximum that you are willing to pay to achieve an objective.

But, is it really "about inadequate force commitments?"  Is there really a need for more "swaggering leaders?"  Is it really about our reluctance to "pay a high price" for victory?  Is our failure in Vietnam and Iraq really a failure of will and our unwillingness to commit the adequate number of troops on the ground to succeed?  Is the Powell Doctrine sound?

The Death Mask of War

Critics of the war in Iraq often refer to Abu Ghraib as the epitome of torture and abuse in that struggle.  In important ways they might be correct.  For as soon as the shocking images of Abu Ghraib were put on public display, it became obvious to the world that U.S. leadership in Iraq was morally corrupt. 

Hooded Prisoner
Tortured at Abu Ghraib

Since then, the very mention of Abu Ghraib calls to mind: 1) the U.S. failure to defend the inviolability of human rights; 2) the expedient U.S. withdrawal from its long-standing commitment to civil liberties; and 3) the U.S. willingness to contravene the Geneva Convention whenever such action becomes convenient.  Given all this, Abu Ghraib is now etched in the world's consciousness as a time and place where U.S. arbitrariness took precedence over American principle, tradition, and law.

Faced with such profound criticism, few Americans today would deny that Abu Ghraib represents a shameful chapter in our national history.  To most, it signals an unequivocal disregard for justice flowing out of an arrogant willingness to act as though "the end justifies the means."